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Such in brief is Mr. Sutherland's argument. That it is open to criticism in many points is obvious, but it is not possible to develop those points within the limits of a review. The book displays the faults inseparable from the work of an amateur, especially a lack of nice discrimination between concepts which are similar but essentially distinct, and a defective acquaintance with the work of other men in the same field. To the first caption belong Mr. Sutherland's identification of sympathy and love, his genesis of conjugal from parental love, and his tendency to confuse "right conduct" with "conduct prompted by sympathy," a distinction which in some passages he explicitly recognizes. To the second Mr. Sutherland owes his claim to be accounted one of the original discoverers of the somatic character of the emotions, a discovery which James and Lange published in 1884 and 1885, as well as his inability to give any explanation of the nature of imitation. The most valuable part of the book lies in the rich mass of statistical material which Mr. Sutherland has not only collected and tabulated with infinite pains, but has also enriched by many original and suggestive observations.

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An Essay on Western Civilization in Its Economic Aspects (Ancient Times). By W. CUNNINGHAM, D. D. Pp. xii, 220. 8vo. Price, \$1.60. Cambridge University Press, 1898.

In an introductory chapter Professor Cunningham lets the reader feel, without specifically pointing them out, the peculiar difficulties in the way of a satisfactory treatment of the economic history of ancient times. Not only are sources of information meagre or in some instances wholly wanting, but owing to the predominant militarism of ancient nations and their isolation one from another it is impossible to trace general tendencies in development or to employ an analytic method. The treatment is necessarily chronological and national. Professor Cunningham's essay thus falls naturally into three parts corresponding to the three principal civilizations of antiquity, viz.: those of Egypt, Greece and Rome.

The story of Egyptian economic life is possibly the least interesting chapter of the book. Material is of course scanty, and, even were it more abundant, it could tell only of activities which from the economist's point of view are extremely rudimentary. Little more than an account of agriculture and a catalogue of public works can be included in this chapter of history. Of Judæa and Phœnicia, which are discussed in subsequent sections not much can be learned. True, commerce

and trade began in a crude way, but no elaborate or sustained development can be traced. Historical material is still scarce and reliance must be placed upon the obscure and chance references to the subject found in various early writings.

More can be learned of Greece. Many of the Greek cities developed a highly-complex industrialism; and governments had practically the same sources of revenue as in modern times. Thus, in the case of Athens, the treasury could rely on the income from state property, *e. g.*, land and mines; from public works, such as harbors and theatres; from fees; from the tribute of aliens; from regular taxation, direct and indirect, customs dues, etc. Trade became highly developed both because of advantages of geographical position and the natural predilection of the inhabitants for commerce. A colonial policy was adopted; and the different states set themselves to stimulate trade. The prosperity thus acquired was however destroyed by war, and, Professor Cunningham thinks, by too extensive sinking of capital in fixed forms—as in the expensive public buildings on the Acropolis of Athens. Thus economic resources were wasted and a collapse necessarily resulted.

Much the most useful because most exact and definite portion of the essay is that which treats of Rome and her industrial development. After an outline of the struggle between Rome and Carthage for supremacy in the west, Dr. Cunningham considers economic conditions under the republic and the empire. The main economic reason for the fall of the republic lay in the fact of faulty economic organization and insufficient guarantee of industrial security by the state. Agriculture was conducted upon a bad system borrowed from Carthage—that of *latifundia*—heavy military contributions depressed industry, and the so-called *publicani* and *negotiajores* were allowed to exploit economic resources at will. All of these abuses called for reform; the republic failed to grant it; the result was the empire. For a time there was distinct economic improvement. National finance was better conducted; a stronger colonial policy was inaugurated, and great public works were carried forward. But this policy contained within itself the seeds of danger. With the growth of a world empire came administrative abuses; the completion of public works, implied the “unproductive expenditure” of capital. The volume of money became inadequate and its distribution was bad. This rendered it difficult to pay as well as to collect taxes, and there was “no opportunity for the saving of wealth and the formation of fresh capital” because there were no “supplies of material available for hoarding.” The cost of defence grew heavier, the fiscal system broke down, usury grew, and finally the economic constitution of the empire fell

to pieces. A chapter on Constantinople as the successor to Rome closes the book.

Professor Cunningham has unquestionably woven the scattered threads of history at our command into a bit of true economic tapestry but the weaving is apparent and the warp may be clearly distinguished from the woof. The result may serve to hide a bare spot on the economic wall but the life-likeness of a photographic reproduction or of a true painting of ancient conditions it does not possess. This, no doubt, is the fault of the material. The criticism of the workmanship must be that inferences of an *ex post facto* sort founded upon meagre evidence and having no vital connection with the work itself are often thrust upon the reader's attention. There is also on many pages a marked carelessness in the use of words. The maps which are included leave much to be desired.

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Grandeur et décadence de la guerre. Par G. DE MOLINARI. Paris: Guillaumin et Cie, 1898.

War produced security in the civilized world. The accomplishment of that work constituted the utility and grandeur of war. This task achieved, war has ceased to respond to any need; after having been useful, it has become injurious. A period of decadence has succeeded the period of grandeur. The object of the book in review is to support the foregoing propositions and to discover the influences which assure the ultimate disappearance of war. It is to be regretted that there is not in English a work of this scope, which goes to the fundamental causes of war and armaments in a manner so fascinating and instructive.

Competition for means of subsistence has been the cause of war. Originally physical prowess determined survival. With the growth of intelligence, victory passed from physical to mental superiority. Intelligence increased not only the destructive capacity of man but also his productive capacity. Defence—preparation—was the necessary condition to security, which is in turn indispensable to production. Henceforth, the successful industrial nation is the most secure, and the non-industrial nations are unable to offer effective competition because they have no security. War achieved its work in giving industrialism security against non-industrialism and in effecting competition in production. As the superiority of industrial nations became manifest, the idea of universal peace took deep root in the minds of men. The period of recrudescence, which followed the French revolution, was,